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THE

MULTMSIONS
OF MULTICULTURALISM
Edward James

A:.

the story goes, the Lone Ranger was
surrounded by hostile Indians and
aid, "Well Tonto, we're in a fIx!"-to
which Tonto replied, "Who's the 'we' kemo
sabe?" This question, "Who's the we?" is
the core question of multiculturalism-and
that we cannot easily answer it is the sting
of multiculturalism. To properly defIne the
we , it is essential to address questions of
inclusion: Who and what is to be taught?questions of criteria: On what grounds, if
any, can "we" make appraisals of "other
cultures"?-questions of self-identity:
When I say "we," who am I including in
such august company?---questions of the
meaning of multiculturalism: What is it?
What is its purpose?
This discussion will thus seek to provide a framework (i) that allows us to begin
a discussion that might answer such questions, (ii) that illuminates why it is that such
a modest aim is the most we can hope for
at this time, and (iii) that provides an understanding of what we can do in a
multicultural world in order to illuminate
what we should do. Let's begin by examining some of the approaches to understanding multiculturalism.

1. Muscular multiculturalism: One
immediate response by many in the USA to
such questions is an appeal to the ideal of
tolerance-an ideal that Sir Isaiah Berlin,
perhaps more than any thinker in our time,
has argued for and articulated.
Berlin's central argument for toleration
is that belief in the one true view has repeatedly led to disaster. In his celebrated
"Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin writes:
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"One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the
altars of the great historical ideals ... This
is the belief that somewhere, in the past or
in the future, in divine revelation or the
mind of the individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in
the simple heart of an uncorrupted good
man, there is a fInal solution." The belief in
the One Truth, and that we have it, is in
Berlin's mind the theoretical basis of the
Holocaust and ethnic cleansings of our awful century. Asecond argument that Berlin
offers for toleration is 'that we have no right
to insist that all be educated in our way,
unless we know that we are pure and
good-precisely what we do not and cannot know. In his essay "Tolstoy and Enlightenment" Berlin analyzes Tolstoy's "Who
Should Teach Whom to Write: We the Peasant Children or the Peasant Children Us?,"
where Tolstoy argued that the history of
education is a history of tyranny, where each
new school "struck off one yoke only to put
another in its place." The scholastics
pushed Greek, the language of Aristotle;
Luther advocated Hebrew, the language of
God; Bacon insisted on science, the language of nature. "But about one thing they
were all agreed: that one must liberate the
young from the blind despotism of the old;
and each immediately substituted its own
fanatical, enslaving dogma in its place."
Further, Tolstoy sees no way out of this tyranny. While he believes that "only the pure
can rescue us ... who, he reasonably asks,
will educate the educators?" For us to be
educated, we need to recognize the pure
among us as our teachers. But to recognize the pure among us is already to be pure,
is it not? So to become pure and educated
we need already to be pure and educatedan impossibility. "Yet he believed that a fInal solution to the problem of how to apply
the principles of Jesus must exist"-a belief that Berlin was not able to accept. For
to insist that all conform to such a faith is
precisely what we must avoid, insofar as
such a belief leads to terrible oppressionto none other than Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor, the one who crucifIes Christ in the
name of Christ. So, Berlin, unlike Tolstoy,
is left with a pessimism of necessary value
conflict. As he put it in his "Two Concepts
of Liberty": "The world that we encounter
in ordinary experience is one in which we
are faced with choices between ends equally
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ultimate and claims equally absolute, the
realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifIce of others." Thus,
Berlin concludes with a third argument for
toleration, that it is precisely because of the
lack of any universally held overarching view
that we "place such immense value upon
the freedom to choose," for we are willing
to let no one else decide for us how we are
to choose among the competing views.
Berlin presents us with a muscular
multiculturalism of toleration. But the
muscles Berlin flexes in the name of toleration are themselves bound by the hard hit
of Tolstoy, that tolerance and its espousal
of choice itself becomes just one other oppressive ideal among others. For starters,
consider toleration's paradox of condescension. The ideal of toleration requires
us only to "put up with" those who have
different views from our own. So "we in
our wisdom" allow those who are benighted
enough to differ from us to express their
views. But such an attitude of superiority
itself soon slides into intolerance; for our
sense of superiority allows us to ridicule and
disdain those who would disagree with us.
Berlin was willing to accept this paradox.
Others are not.
2. Maximal multiculturalism: In order to avoid what Kant warned of as the "arrogant title of tolerance," others argue that
multiculturalism should go beyond toleration and advocate, say, a respect for other
views and cultures-or even a celebration
of other views and cultures. Such views I
will speak of as forms of maximal
multiculturalism-the view that
multiculturalism is a good and not a mere
necessary evil.
Such a maximal multiculturalism can
be seen in John Milton's ''Areopagitica.''
Milton argued that to be good one had to
be good knowingly, aware of the amazing
convolutions of human life. First, one had
to be good knowingly: A "heretic in the
truth," says Milton, includes one "who believes things only because his pastor says
so, or the Assembly so determines, without
knowing other reason." Such a belief, even
if true, is not "within" a person but is without, unstable or "movable." Second, to
know one must know the amazing convolutions of human life. Truth itself is not to
be simply had just because truth is not
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simple. As Osiris was cut up into a thoumind? Is such an insistence multicultural?
sand pieces, so Truth has been "scattered ..
4. All of us have the One True View:
to the four winds." Thus Milton dares us to
What implicitly follows from such paradoxes
answer why it is "impossible that [Truth]
is that no matter what we say, we will do so
may have more shapes than one." The truth
from the perspective of the one true view.
is that given the marvelous multifarious- ,
All of us, inescapably, as a matter both of
ness of truth and the deep urge to underlogic and also of the way we live our lives,
stand that is so much a part of us, "there of
have the one true view. For instance, to
necessity will be much arguing, much writinsist on our fallibilism is to betray how our
ing' many opinions; for opinion in good
fallibilism is the view in terms of which one
men is but knowledge in the making." As a
evaluates and justifies all other views. While
result, those who prevent others from speakwe may look at our fallibilism critically, we
ing "are the troublers, they are the dividers
do so not by asking how to radically reconof unity," who "permit not others to unite
struct it but by asking how to improve itthose dissevered pieces which are yet wanta question not foreign to any fundamentaling to the body of Truth." Consequently,
diversity of views is not a matter to lament
but rather a matter "to rejoice at, to praise
this pious forwardness" among fellow inquirers. For "Truth is strong, next to the
Almighty," and will emerge victorious
through freedom of inquiry.

3. Three hard paradoxes: However,
any ideal concerning multiculturalism carries the heavy baggage of three hard intertwined paradoxes-paradoxes that many see
as straight-out inconsistencies.
First, there is the paradox of commitment. Are we to tolerate, respect or celebrate all ways oflife?-say , the intolerant,
the disrespectful and the non-celebrators of
other views? And if we follow Berlin and
are not tolerant of the intolerant, then are
we not simply espousing our own views of
what should and should not be accepted and
thus adopting a stance that is antimulticultural?
Second, there is the paradox of justification. That and of what we should be
tolerant, respectful, or celebratory are not
self-evident and so must be justified. But
any justification will be in terms of certain
ideals. Consequently, will it not be the case
that the ideal appealed to will be antimulticultural insofar as it insists that its
brand of multiculturalism be adopted?
Finally, there is the paradox of teaching. For we in our wisdom aim to teach
our students, say, to tolerate, respect, or celebrate those who differ from us. But most
societies and sub-cultures do not accept toleration, respect, or the celebration of other
cultures as an ideal. So are teachers to insist that their students conform to their ideal
when their students have another ideal in

ism. Hence our fallibilism is practically
speaking infallibilistic, the one true view,
just because we cannot radically question
it.
Thus, it turns out, we look into the mirror and behold: They are us. We, all of us,
are fundamentalists in the multicultural
world.
5. Minimal multiculturalism: So
where do we go from here? I believe that we
can return to my initial points-that it is a
given that we live in a multicultural world,
that we find ourselves addressing people of
other cultures and vastly different perspectives, that we lack a consensus on how to
address this world, and, then add: that the
"we" I refer to here are those who grant
these givens. Not to grant them is to be
deservedly dismissed from the discussion.
And an agreement on them is what I will
speak of as minimal multiculturalism-
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what we can legitimately expect and thus
demand from any other.
"But that says very little!" And indeed
it does-although it took a while to see why
we must say so little, why we cannot initially presume to say more. Minimal
multiculturalism is the hard recognition of
our small but disagreeable world. To expect
more is to overlook that there is no world
culture that we can appeal to in order to
argue for some more benevolent form of
multiculturalism. The world contains its
Maos as well as its Gandhis. While we may
be working toward or groping for a world
culture, what that culture looks like is
only a glimmer in our eyes. World
multiculturalism is minimal multiculturalism.
Hence, if we are to say more and go
beyond minimal multiculturalism, we must
assume a more specific context than "the
contemporary world." So let us narrow the
context and see if we can say more by considering what it means to live in a society
like that of the USA today, as found, say, in
a public college.

6. Mitigated multiculturalism: For
starters, as a public place in the USA, the
college is composed of many many sorts of
people-people who do not look alike, think
alike, dress alike, eat alike. . .. More, as a
public college, it is engaged in a type of inquiry, which itself sets up standards of evidence, standards which lead us to the recognition that we do not always agree on
what inquiry is about or even on how it is
to be conducted. In a paradox, we in such
a public place cannot expect us to be a we.
Rather, we are an uneasy we. We are not
the world: we do live in one society or nation state, a nation state with a heritage of
rights and "way of doing business." But we
rest uneasily in this, in that we do not agree,
and never have agreed, on what "all of this"
is and means.
This lack of agreement on what the we
means paradoxically leads to an agreement
that goes beyond minimal multiculturalism,
what I will speak of as mitigated
multiculturalism. The uneasy we in the
USA can expect that (i) we cannot publicly
assume a maximal multiculturalism, for not
all of us with Milton see pluralism as a great
good-as, I confess, I do; (ii) no view will
be publicly regarded as sacred or closed to
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radical challenge, (iii) all views will be publicly challenged, and (iv) critics and defenders of the various views do no violence to
each other-they in some way or another
put up with or tolerate each other.
Why we can expect (i)-(iii) of mitigated
multiculturalism to be given follows from
the observation of the vast variety of people
and perspectives in the USA. But why we
can expect the tolerance of (iv) takes a longer
story.
7. No ideal can justify mitigated
multiculturalism: Crucially, we cannot justify such tolerance by any specific appeal to
some ideal-a vision of how human life
should be. For all ideals are in question.
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that no group of the uneasy us can expect
any other group to respect or welcome its
Primary Truths or to remain silent about
their Primary Truths. We cannot expect a
Bob Jones University or, following Pope
John Paul II and the USA philosopher
Alasdair Macintyre, a Roman Catholic college or university, to tolerate, let alone welcome, all views. But the uneasy we can expect that in the public arena we tolerate each
other, that we put up with each other, in
order to give each other a vent and thereby
avoid universal war. ~ome what may, we,
whoever we may be, will make ourselves
heard. If we are prevented from making

Nor can we justify tolerance in terms
of a heritage like the Bill of Rights, emphasizing freedom of speech, religion, and inquiry. To do so is only to beg the question.
For this heritage was sharply challenged
when it was first instituted, both as to what
it meant and covered and also as to whether
it was a good idea at all, and it is sharply
challenged today.
Consider, for instance, the story that
underlying the Bill of Rights was the
Augustinean-Puritan ideal of the individual
standing alone before God. This ideal required that all support the community's
church. For the Puritans the primary right
was not the right of the individual but the
right of the community to worship and
question as it saw fit. For such rights John
Winthrop left England and Roger Willliams
fled Massachusetts-to form a new Republic that would worship as it, the New Republic, saw fit. Thus the Bill of Right's idea
of rights as the defining core of individual
as opposed to communal choice could only
be seen by the purists of the Puritan tradition then and today as abominations.
And add to this story all of the other
stories that inform the USA, and what results is both a reaffirmation of (i)-(iii) of
mitigated multiculturalism, an appreciation
of the USA as a mini-world, and also a
requestioning of the tolerance of (iv) in
mitigated multiculturalism. Why, to repeat, the toleration of mitigated
m ulticulturalism?
8. Fear justifies mitigated
multiculturalism: The justification of mitigated multiculturalism rests on the given
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man possibility, but on a fear of others and
the horrible consequences that will result if
they are denied their say.
Negative toleration is hardly a positive
ideal, one that each party celebrates, but is
unwelcome in at least four ways. First, it is
unwelcome in that it is justified by fear of
others and what bad things they can and
will do to us if they are prevented from expressing themselves. Second, it is unwelcome in that it has force only when the other
has power and is willing to use it. It thus
charges us all to be on our guard against
those who would deny it to us and warns
that we must rely on ourselves to protect
our core ideals. Third, it is unwelcome in
that it represents a failure-either our failure to make the other see our One Truth,
or, more likely to be said, the other's failure
to accept our One Truth. And finally, it is
unwelcome in that it is not an end in itself,
some ideal orvision to embrace, but a mere
means to an end. It allows us to live, not
together as one, but side by side yet apart,
as we seek to find ways of getting the other
to see. It allows us to carryon war by other
means.
10. Negative toleration sidesteps the
paradoxes of positive toleration: The
negative toleration of mitigated
multiculturalism avoids the four paradoxes
that plagued positive toleration-by not allowing them to arise. It does not allow them
to arise just because it does not view itself
as something good in itself.

ourselves heard, what will result is a kind of
war, a willingness to do each other harmwhich the uneasy we agrees must be
avoided. Thus we all must be persuaded
that at least this is available to us, to each
and every one of us, that we can act and
speak out in public arenas-provided that
our acting and speaking are not violent.
Such toleration is the minimum that we can
expect and the maximum that we can demand in a public arena in the USA.
9. Positive and negative toleration:
Mitigated multiculturalism thus distinguishes two types of toleration-positive
and negative. On the one hand, positive
toleration is built on some ideal or vision
of how human life should be lived-e.g.,
Berlin's centrality of individual choice, or
John Stuart Mill's idea of unrestricted inquiry. On the other hand, negative toleration is built on no such affirmation of hu-
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First, it sidesteps the paradox of condescension by not deigning to tolerate the
other out of any superior ideal but by being
forced to tolerate the other out of fear-a
kind of respect. It slides by the paradox of
commitment by not being committed to
toleration as an ideal, but by being committed to one's own self-expression. It dodges
the paradox of justification by rejecting
the notion that the justification of toleration must be in terms of certain idealsideals which it inflicts on others. Fear of
the other is no ideal to be attained but is
brute reality to be addressed. And finally, it
finesses the paradox of teaching by claiming that negative toleration is no superior
view to be taught but rather an inferior position to be endured.

----------------11. The paradox of mitigated
multiculturalism: Nonetheless, from these
considerations
follows
mitigated
multiculturalism's own paradox: it is what
we can all agree on and what no one wants.
No one wants it, moreover, not only because
it is unwelcome in the four above-mentioned ways, but also because of its resemblance to that stark Hobbesian understanding of human motivation and of government-where all of us seek to advance our
own self interest merely because it is our
own self-interest, so that we will advance
our own self-interest in whatever way we
can. Hence, if we have the might we have
the right, the reason of self-interest, to do
whatever we will-whether that be lying,
cheating, maiming, or brutalizing othersto advance our interests. Consequently, almost all of us, even those of us who are in
power, take great pains to persuade others
that they are not working just out of selfinterest alone, but rather have other reasons
or ideals to restrain and guide them.
But what these other reasons or ideals
are, why we are not to run rampant over
the interests of others when it is in our selfinterest to do so and we can "get away with
it," and what these reasons themselves entail remain much in question. The sheer
number and force of the reasons as to why
most reject Hobbes as the last word reinforces the necessity of mitigated
multiculturalism's negative tolerance. Just
because most cannot agree on why Hobbes
is to be rejected, and just because each competing reason as to why Hobbes is to be rejected carries with it profound social consequences, we need a Hobbesian grounding to society with respect to free speech
and human expression to protect ourselves
from those who would surpass Hobbes.
Such a grounding satisfies no one.

12. A more complete and hopeful
mitigated multiculturalism: If we are all
agreed that Hobbes is unsatisfactory and
must be surpassed, might this offer us further guidance?
Well, as a start, this agreement that we
want to go beyond the negative tolerance
of mitigated multiculturalism entails a further agreement to seek out and explore ways
to go beyond it-even by the uneasy us. For
if we are committed to the idea that Hobbesian negative tolerance must be surpassed
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and that we cannot surpass Hobbes by forcing our views on others-for that would
only reinforce the grim Hobbesian worldthen what follows is the necessity of us, the
uneasy us, engaging in the hard discussion
of how we can surpass Hobbes. And this
question in turn leads us to ask how the
uneasy we can become a less uneasy we.
Such an exploration of how we can become less uneasy with each other will involve seeking new ways of putting up with
each other that are not out of fear. One tack
I believe it will take is that of questioning
the idea of power. For Hobbes' observation
that we are moved to the spirit of accommodation by a respect for the power of the
other remains central. The question to ask
is whether power is merely the capacity to
control, to hurt, and to harm, as we see it
work in Hobbes. We can ask whether power
might also be the capacity to persuade, to
gain empathy and sympathy, to move by
compassion, to reach out to others with
one's humanity, to illuminate the reasons
that lead one to adopt with passion the views
one has, to force others to listen by the logic
of one's language, . . .. Power, in other
words, itself is a much contested notiona notion that the uneasy we can perhaps
agree is much in need of redefinition in our
multicultural world, on pain of being reduced to Hobbes' world of mutual and universal distrust.
What follows, then, is a more complete
definition of mitigated multiculturalism(i) that we cannot publicly assume a maximal multiculturalism; that we can expect
that (ii) no view will be publicly regarded as
sacred or closed to fundamental questioning, (iii) that all views will be publicly scrutinized and challenged, (iv) that critics and
defenders of the various views do no violence to each other-that they in some way
or another put up with or tolerate each other
out of fear of each other; and, finally, (v)
that (a) this negative toleration is unwelcome to all and (b) we all seek ways of surpassing it-perhaps by imagining notions
of power that go beyond brute force and
even touch on sympathy, respect, compassion, human solidarity.
Such a multiculturalism, mitigated as
it is, may allow us the intellectual framework to build the new world the uneasy we
say we seek. But it will have to be con-
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structed context by context, culture by culture, country by country. For I suspect that
French Egalitarianism, German Volk and
Blut, English nobility and commoner, Indian secularism and sects, ... , will all draw
strikingly different slants than the stories
of multiculturalism made in the USA.
Further, if and when the world gets
smaller, if and when it becomes more and
more clear that we live in the world as we
live in our country, then minimal
multiculturalism might be reconceived as
mitigated. But how to get us, all of us, to
live in the world as we live in our country is
currently beyond our reach. For while we
all may agree that toleration out of fear is
not enough, we do not agree that the world
is our country. We in the world still do not
have to tolerate each other in the way that
we in the USA must tolerate each other.
Perhaps as the world becomes more and
more polluted and the resources of the
world more and more depleted, so that the
powerful of the world can no longer escape
the hardships that most face on a day to
day basis, ... But all of this is another story.
In any case, ideally the public college
uniquely stands as a safe haven and crucible, a sustained experiment in critically
and imaginatively understanding and expressing power, where many cultures and
visions may interact without doctrinaire
restraint or violence. In this it sets a standard for all the world to see: it ideally is the
guaranteed arena of unrestricted self-reflective non-violent inquiry. It is an exciting
place to be. And I am glad to be a part of it. ~
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